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Notes on Language in the Clinic in a Lacanian Key
SEAN J. CARROLL
Department of Counseling, Division of Counseling and Family Therapy, Rueckert-Hartman
College of Health Professions, Regis University, Thornton, CO
There is no shortage of therapeutic modalities and interventions at the therapist’s disposal.
Psychotherapy, because it claims to treat the individual, is necessarily multifaceted and complex.
The dimension of language which structures much of our experience should be considered as a
starting point for a psychotherapeutic technique. French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan developed
a theory and technique of the talking cure beginning from this assumption: that language structures
our experience. In the early 1950s he sought to recover a linguistic Freud: to re-center
psychoanalytic psychotherapy on language itself. In this paper, I sketch the theoretical reasons for
this turn in Lacan and look at current clinical literature to explicate the technique of this linguistic
approach to psychotherapy. I begin first with challenging our everyday understanding of language;
then, I explore the theoretical aspects of language and speech; finally, I tie these investigations into
a clinical approach with a brief case study and analysis.
KEYWORDS: Lacan, language, psychoanalysis, technique, psychoanalytic psychotherapy
Lacanian Notes on Language in the Clinic
What happens when we speak? Do we directly convey what we are feeling to another person, a
listener? Or do we speak mostly in metaphor, only approximating what we think we feel? Why is
it that we so often feel misunderstood no matter how well we articulate ourselves? More
disconcerting for many of us: why is it that we leave conversations or arguments feeling as if we
could have said more, or said it differently?
If this dilemma is not at the forefront of us as social creatures—life would be far too
cumbersome if we had to analyze our linguistic assumptions each time we decided to speak—it
should certainly be at the forefront of psychotherapists. Psychotherapy, if it is the ‘talking cure’,
relies almost entirely on language and how the client uses it to describe their inner experience,
their suffering, and their life story. Should the psychotherapist not be concerned with the speech
of his client from the start? Lacan is perhaps most well-known for his linguistic approach to
psychoanalysis. In his first seminar, given in 1953-1954, he sought a ‘return to Freud’. From that
point onward, Lacanians have devoted an immense amount of time and energy to studying the
nature and structure of speech as it pertains to effective clinical work (see Fink [2014] and Soler
[1996a, 1996b]). I would like to spend some time on this clinically-informed theory of language
and see what psychotherapy today can learn from this psychoanalysis. In the end, I am led by the
question: What happens when the client speaks to the therapist?
The Structure of Language
First: a note of distinction. Big Other and little other signify two separate entities. The
former is roughly synonymous with Freud’s superegoic structure with the added element of
language. In other words, the Other is the field within which social ideals, parental demands,
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religious or cultural narratives, etc., are registered (see Glowinski, Marks, and Murphy’s [2001]
entry on “Signifier”). This is also the field where language resides. ‘Little other’ has more to do
with ego to ego relations, i.e., the interpersonal field. When I speak to my friend, I am speaking to
the other; when I speak to God, I am speaking to the Other.
Speech is always in the service of the O/other. It is not for the self or self-serving. By
nature, language is social: it conveys something to another. In Colette Soler’s words, “speech
implies the Other” (1996a, p. 47). The listener occupies the place of the Other in the case of speech,
which opens up the space for the symbolic order to enter. There is something significant in this: it
is the role of the listener to determine what to do with the subject’s speech. This ‘role’ is reflected
in questions such as, “What does this person mean? Is there meaning behind what they are saying?
Are they demanding something? What kind of response are they expecting from me?” In everyday
communication, these questions go largely unanswered. In psychotherapy—psychoanalytic
psychotherapy, that is—these are essential. Anyone who has worked in a clinical role has
experienced the moment when a patient or client says something directed at the therapist, and the
latter is unsure how to respond, evoking a sense of anxiety.
So, a subject’s speech implies the Other. The meaning of the speech uttered by the subject
is then determined by the Other retroactively. In other words: the speaker does not determine the
meaning of what they have said (Soler, 1996b). Based on how the listener answers those questions
to herself, the meaning of the statement is determined. “The statement is made by the subject, but
the message is chosen by the Other” (Soler, 1996a, p. 48). How is this possible? Every statement
is ambiguous. We cannot speak and mean only one thing. Herein arises the frustration we observed
at the beginning of this paper when we leave a conversation feeling as if the other person did not
fully understand what we meant, no matter how long the conversation was, no matter how many
times we were able to re-articulate our position. This is not the fault of the speaker: this is the
structure of language.
There is a certain ‘loosening up’ of the chain of speech in the subject. There is a gap or
rupture between signifier and signified (between the sound of a word when someone speaks and
the visual/imaginary concept he is trying to convey), effectively making some wiggle room in the
meaning of a subject’s speech (see Fink, 2014). This gap can be understood as ambiguity.
Structurally, it is the difference between Saussure’s (1916) sign and sound pattern or concept,
referred to in subsequent literature as signifier and signified. Saussure describes two fundamental
characteristics of the sign and concept in the function of language. First, “the linguistic sign is
arbitrary” (1916, p. 101): there is no intrinsic reason for a connection or association between a
particular signifier and its signification other than mere convention and social obligation. For
example, the word “tree” has no inherent tie to our concept of tree. This is clearly shown by the
fact that different languages exist, and that the signification of “tree” means different things in
different contexts. Second, “the elements of [linguistic] signals are presented one after another:
they form a chain” (ibid., p. 104): there is a fundamental linear direction in the structure of
language. One word simply follows another, and the meaning of a statement is not fully understood
until after it is uttered, that is, retroactively. 1
It is between this space—between the signifier and the signified—that we can conceive of
ambiguity in the language of the speaking subject. Because there is no inherent anchor by which a
signifier is attached to a thing, language ‘slides around.’ There is no fixed meaning to what we
1

The relationship between Lacan and Saussure is complicated in H. Glowinski, Z. M. Marks, and S. Murphy (Eds.)
A Compendium of Lacanian Terms (2001) in the chapter on the signifier, but our treatment of Saussure here is only
cursory enough to explore the basic tenets of structuralist linguistics.
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say, because there is no fixed meaning in the structure of the language we use. The implication of
this is that we cannot directly communicate what we mean to the other, the listener. This is to reemphasize what we said earlier about the structure of language in that speech implies the O/other
(i.e., speech → Other). The meaning is actually chosen by the other to whom we are speaking, not
by the speaker.
We learn early on to communicate our needs to some O/other (caregivers, teachers, older
siblings) by way of language, and so we come to associate an internal state (e.g., hunger) with a
certain phrase or demand (e.g., “I’m hungry”). This is the true meaning behind the phrase that
‘language is social’: it is social because it is for the other (person/mother/father/sibling/teacher).
Not only is language determined by the Other, it is given by the Other (see especially Soler, 1996a
and 1996b). The very medium we use to express how we feel and what we desire is not even our
medium. In perhaps his most existentialist moment, Lacan tells that one of the paradoxical
relations of language and speech is that of “the subject who loses his meaning in the
objectifications of his discourse. However metaphysical its definition may seem, we cannot ignore
its presence in the foreground of our experience. For this is the most profound alienation of the
subject in our scientific civilization…” (1953, p. 233). Alienation, in other words, is the
consequence of everyday—and even scientific-philosophical—language, including weighty terms
such as “co-dependence” and “trauma”. True speech and expression is closed off by language, but
also only possible with language.
(Mis)understanding
In our everyday life, we associate among others via what Lacan calls ‘the imaginary’. That
is, we view other people more or less like ourselves. Cognitive scientists may call this our internal
“theory of mind” or even more broadly as “empathy”. In this mode of being, which is necessary
for smooth social interaction, we approach the world and other people with the intent of
understanding: we may assume the reason behind another person’s actions or we might use
categories to ‘box someone in’ so that they don’t seem so utterly other or alien to us. However, in
Lacanian psychoanalysis, “Understanding should not be taken as end in itself since it can serve as
a resistance” (Fink, 2014). Looking for meaning and understanding in one’s life can often serve as
a rationalization for one’s behavior. On the contrary, it is the role of psychoanalysis to undermine
meaning and to take it apart, to “[remind] analysands that they are not masters in their own homes
and that part of psychic health is giving up the obsession with mastery” (ibid.). It is only when one
relinquishes the demand for a rigid and ‘accurate’ meaning of one’s thoughts and behaviors that
one can fully explore the aspects of one’s wishes, desires, longings, fears, and anxieties in a richer
and deeper way. This way of thinking is also representative of the difference between
developmental-etiological psychology (i.e., finding ‘the source’ of one’s ailments and following it
forward) and retroactive-narrative psychology (i.e., reconstituting the past through one’s present
discourse), the latter of which Lacan (1975) claims is the proper way to read Freud.
Therapists feel comfortable when their clients fit neatly into a diagnostic manual. However,
this is when the psychotherapist is operating as if the unconscious contents and inner- and interexperience of the subject before them is knowable and analogous to theirs. This can stunt further
exploration of the subject into him/herself, as it effectively cuts off retroactive meaning and the
excitement of pursuing alternative meanings to one’s narrative. Any reader who has been in
therapy with a therapist who is quick to diagnose or seems fixated on a certain meaning of an event
can attest to the suffocation of this way of working. This would, in Lacan’s term, not take the
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alienation in language which is constitutive of modern subjectivity into account. Soler tells us that
“speech—true or full speech—is an act. An act is something that has a creative function; it brings
something new into the world” (1996, p. 47). Using pre-described interpretations drowns the
potential creativity of speech.
Technique: Language in the Clinic
In Lacan’s 1949 paper on the mirror stage, he formulates his notion of the ego: the
child/infant is a bundle of experiences with no seemingly meaningful connection between them,
an experience he refers to as the “fragmented body”. S/he then sees him/herself in the mirror (not
necessarily a literal mirror, but more fundamentally some thing or person which has a reflecting
function) and perceives him/herself as single and coherent entity. All of the experiences the infant
has undergone are now gathered into a central location: the self (or, as Lacan says, the “ideal-I” or
ego). This feeling or experience of the self, then, is always mediated through the Other.
It is at the moment when the subject feels dis-ease or discomfort with her relation to the
Other or to her image of herself that she finds her way to the consulting office of a therapist. What
occurs in this ‘neurotic structure’ is repression: a signifier (a word or thought that is somehow
dissociated from the event, feeling, or affect in its context) is repressed, and is then ‘linked up’
with the chain of signifiers already in operation in the unconscious. This psychodynamic drama
what Lacan means when he says that the unconscious is structured like a language, “a kind of
foreign language that we are not immediately able to read” (Fink, 1997, p. 113). The repressed is
then manifested as symptoms. The ego, as discussed above, is consolidated over time around these
repressed signifiers, and as a consequence can become rigid, fearful, obsessive, hysterical, etc.
One of the functions of Lacanian psychoanalysis, then, is to disrupt the ego: to shake things up,
move things around, and so on. (Jacques-Alain Miller suggests that, while the subject is fluid and
ambiguous, the ego is static and fixed (1996).) In this way, it evokes a similar response in the
subject to that of a near-death experience in which one’s entire world is flipped upside down, often
culminating in new existential projects centered around what one had previously feared.
A psychotherapeutic approach centered on language would look like the therapist operating
in a kind of negative position in relation to the subject’s egoic discourse. When the subject speaks,
the therapist is there to carefully listen and look for associations in the organization of the client’s
words, finding the places wherein the ambiguity of speech might be made known. This therapeutic
position is made possible due to the principle of the ambiguity of language discussed above. Lacan
(1953) reads Freud’s mechanisms of unconscious disguise as linguistic. Displacement becomes
ellipsis, pleonasm, hyperbaton, syllepsis, regression, repetition, apposition; condensation becomes
metaphor, catachresis, antonomasia, allegory, metonymy, synechdoche. This is what is at stake in
Lacan’s ‘return to Freud’, and what is at stake in his cheeky advice to young psychoanalysts: “Do
crossword puzzles” (1953, p. 220), emphasizing the importance of understand how words are
related to one another on a purely ‘superficial’ or symbolic level. A short case study might help
illustrate this approach to psychotherapy.
Case Study2
A few months into a psychoanalytic treatment, the client—whom we will call “M”—was
recounting her first depressive episode. M was engaged to a man she did not really love, but who
2

The following vignette was graciously given to me by my friend. Details and revealing aspects have been altered.
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her parents approved of, and heavily encouraged her to marry. She had been feeling depressed
since her engagement, which was about two years in, as she kept finding excuses to put off the
wedding. M described her first depression as her “first descent”. In response, the analyst simply
stated, “Descent?” This seemingly banal move opened M up to the ambiguity of the signifier
“descent”, associating it with its homophonous “dissent”. The client then considered the other
possible meaning of her “first dissent” in the form of a depressive episode: her depression was a
form of unconscious rebellion against the wishes of her parents to marry this man whom she did
not love at all. This awareness led her to consider that she felt ambivalence towards the lost object
of another love and the lost opportunity which was effectively (symbolically) closed off by her
parents’ desires. She was rebelling against the path they chose for her, but because the anger
towards her parents was unacceptable to her, it was displaced—moved—and turned inward in the
form of depression (thus, the symptoms of negative self-talk, negative worldview, low self-esteem,
etc.). This was all a hypothesis for the client herself to consider. Again, a fundamental axiom is do
not understand too quickly: understanding can often be resistance in disguise. The important thing
to keep in mind in this example is the simplicity of the intervention of the therapist and the
consequent chain of signifiers and associations it opened up. That is where it should be left for the
moment: as an open question.
In this case, the therapist was able to open up a space in the client’s consideration of her
psychodynamics by highlighting the ambiguity of a word. On the therapist’s side, they listened for
a word which seemed significant to M, and read the potentially multifaceted meaning into it. The
meaning of the sound “descent” was determined by the Other as “dissent”. The hatred towards her
parents was effectively repressed, and the aggression manifested as hatred of the self. As a result,
the ego of the client, which had in part crystallized around this story she was telling herself and
others (“The first depressive episode was my first descent downward…”) was immediately
ruptured, and she was able to ‘access’ her unconscious for a moment. None of this indicates that
the therapist’s technique was right or wrong; but, following Freud, it was productive by opening
up new vistas and pathways in the treatment of the client. That is all the therapist can hope for
when they intervene in the subject’s discourse. Why did the therapist intervene exactly at that
point? An important point to consider is the therapeutic relationship which is not revealed here:
this moment came after months of analysis; perhaps the client had used “descent” before, and
seemed to fixate on describing her life in this way. That said, the therapist’s choice to intervene
precisely at this point is a question to be put aside for now.
Conclusion
In the 1950s, Lacan opened up psychotherapeutic discourse to a linguistic reading of Freud.
While it is sometimes difficult to find exactly where in Freud Lacan retrieves some of his ideas, it
can be more easily understood if one takes into account Lacan’s interest in phenomenology and
structural linguistics. By centering psychotherapeutic practice and technique on language, Lacan
was able to produce an enormous amount of energy amongst his followers since then. A linguisticbased clinical practice means the primacy of the word, of the discourse of the client. This comes
from an essential belief shared with many other therapeutic methods that the story the client
consciously tells themselves is immensely important. The difference for the theory and technique
presented in this paper, however, is that the therapist occupies a negative position in relation to the
subject’s discourse, only intervening as the Other to highlight the absence of absolute meaning and
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rigidity. The ‘goal’ of the therapist is to simply make room in the client’s discourse for insights or
ideas heretofore unconsidered.
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